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ABSTRACT
Background: There is an increasing number of health-care systems using
economic evaluations to inform decisions about the reimbursement of
health technologies. There are usually two separate elements of this
process: assembling relevant evidence and undertaking analyses (technol-
ogy assessment), and decision-making. In most systems, technology assess-
ment is undertaken by the manufacturer of the technology. In a few,
“third-party” assessment is used.
Methods: In the United Kingdom, the National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence used a combination of third-party and manufacturer
assessments between 1999 and 2005. After this point, a Single Technology
Appraisal program (using manufacturer-based assessment) was instituted
for some technologies. Here the role of third-party assessment is considered
in this from of decision-making. The article reviews the requirements of
economic evaluation to support decision-making, and considers the extent
to which each type of assessment is likely to meet these requirements. It also
attempts to address whether the two forms of assessment differ in their
impact on decision-making using a comparison of the decisions made by
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) (under its
multiple-technology appraisal system) and the Scottish Medicines Consor-
tium (SMC), which relies on manufacturer assessment.
Results: The comparison is limited by the small number of technologies
considered by both bodies. Nevertheless, it suggests that there are poten-
tially important differences between the two bodies, with NICE generally
placing more restrictions of the use of technologies.
Conclusions: The article concludes that there are potential advantages to
third-party assessment, but its cost and timing may preclude its use for all
new technologies. A hybrid arrangement is suggested where third-party
assessment is used in particular circumstances.
Keywords: cost-effectiveness analysis, decision models, health economics
methods, priority setting, UK NHS.
Introduction
Many health-care systems now require economic evaluations as a
key input into a formal decision-making process about whether to
reimburse/fund/cover new health technologies [1,2]. There are
two distinct components to this use of economic evaluation. The
ﬁrst is the technology assessment process which, here, is under-
stood as the process by which relevant evidence is identiﬁed,
assembled, and synthesized to provide the basis for a clinical
review and cost-effectiveness modeling. The second is decision-
making, into which technology assessment is an important input.
Inmost systems, the technology assessments are undertaken by the
manufacturer, although they are usually critically reviewed by
experts within the system or a third party. In a small subset of
systems, however, there is a role for third-party organizations
(usually academic groups) to undertake the assessments, usually in
addition to assessments submitted by the relevant manufacturers.
The use of such third-party assessments exists, for example, with
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in
the United Kingdom and the Medical Services Advisory Commit-
tee, which considers nonpharmaceutical technologies for the
Australian health-care system.
The role of third-party technology assessment in this form of
decision-making has recently been brought to the fore following
NICE’s decision to limit its use in their technology appraisal
process. From its advent in 1999 until the end of 2005, NICE’s
standard process involved a third-party academic group under-
taking a technology assessment report (TAR) to input, together
with manufacturer and professional evidence and analyses, into
the Appraisal Committee’s deliberations. The TAR consists of a
review of relevant clinical and economic evidence, a critical
assessment of one or more manufacturer submissions (which
includes the manufacturers’ own reviews and models), and,
usually, the development of a cost-effectiveness model. These
arrangements still exist for some technologies as part of NICE’s
multiple-technology appraisal (MTA) process. Nevertheless,
since 2006, many technologies (particularly newly licensed
pharmaceuticals) enter a new single-technology appraisal (STA)
process [3]. These arrangements are similar to those in many
systems internationally in that the only reviews and analyses
informing decision-making are undertaken by the manufacturer,
although, as in some other systems, these are accompanied by
critical review of the latter’s submission by a third-party evidence
review group.
This article considers the role of third-party technology
assessments and their potential strengths and weaknesses. The
aim is to inform the important policy question of whether health-
care systems should use third-party technology assessment when
developing new decision-making processes. It can also inform the
speciﬁc debate in the United Kingdom about the balance between
the MTA and STA processes at NICE.
A key issue to consider in addressing this question is the
evidence regarding whether third-party assessment makes a
difference to decisions—that is, are decision-making authorities
more or less likely to support the use of a technology if they have
access to a third-party assessment? Given the limited number of
examples of third-party assessment internationally and the dif-
ferences between decision-making processes in different systems,
which hampers comparison, there is a dearth of such evidence. In
time, some potentially valuable evidence will be provided by
studying the decisions of the NICE Appraisal Committee and
comparing those made under the MTA system with those from
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STAs. Nevertheless, such a comparison will inevitably be con-
strained by the fact that different technologies have been consid-
ered under the two sets of arrangements. Such a comparison is
provided here for those technologies and indications considered
by both organizations, and this updates and extends the com-
parison undertaken by Cairns [4].
To assess different assessment arrangements, the next part of
the article describes the required features of economic evaluation
to inform decision-making about health-care technologies and
considers the possible strengths and weaknesses of third-party
assessment for the achievement of these required features. The
section called “Does Third-PartyAssessmentMake aDifference to
Decisions” presents the comparison of NICE (MTA) and SMC
decisions for a range of technologies. The last section provides a
discussion that considers implications for health-care systems
internationally.
The Requirements of Economic Evaluation to Support
Decision-Making and the Role of Third-Party
Technology Assessment
The advent of economic evaluation studies to inform explicit
decisions about the use of health-care technologies in particular
populations by speciﬁc decision-makers at a point in time has
raised a number of distinct issues about analytical methods.
Various artcles have suggested some general requirements of
economic evaluation in this context [5,6]. Some of these are
particularly relevant to the consideration of the role of third-
party assessment to inform decision-making, and are discussed
below.
Appropriate speciﬁcation of the decision problem. Any eco-
nomic analysis informing decisions needs to be clear about which
patient population(s) and indications are being considered. Once
this is clear, all relevant options need to be deﬁned—that is, the
technologies of interest together with the full list of comparators.
The latter should include not just the “mostly widely used” or
“the most effective,” but all relevant options that can be used in
the system. The deﬁnition of “alternative options” may well
extend to include the speciﬁcation of alternative sequences of
interventions or diagnostic tests and different stopping and start-
ing rules for treatments.
It is generally accepted that research questions should be
explicitly deﬁned before the research is commenced. Consistent
with this, in the context of decision-making about new technolo-
gies, the decision problem should be speciﬁed in advance and be
explicit in any analysis. In many systems, this is left to the
manufacturer to deﬁne within their economic analysis. Although,
in the case of pharmaceuticals, the license deﬁnes the relevant
patient population, there is considerable ﬂexibility for the manu-
facturer in specifying their decision problem even if they are
made aware of the principles.
There seems to be a strong case, however, for the health
system having control of the speciﬁcation of the decision
problem. First, the system should be able to form a view on how
a new technology would be used based on its license, together
with clinical guidelines and advice in that system. Second, the
system should have the best information about the existing ways
of managing the particular patient group (i.e., the comparators).
What implications does this have for the assessment process?
There is some evidence that economic evaluations of technologies
undertaken (or funded) by the manufacturers may indicate better
cost-effectiveness compared with other studies [7–9]. Although
there are a number of potential reasons for this, one possible
explanation is that in making choices between methods
approaches in general, the manufacturer may tend to select those
that show their product in the best light. Although there may be
no intention to bias the results intentionally, decision-makers will
be aware of the potential conﬂicts of interest a manufacturer
faces in making such judgments and may, as a consequence, be
skeptical about some aspects of a submission. Therefore, it is
arguable that with manufacturer assessment, given freedom to
specify the decision problem, some manufacturers may select
comparators that reﬂect (or are perceived to reﬂect) favorably on
their product. Of course, this can be countered with an effective
review process that correctly identiﬁes a potentially misleading
analysis on the basis of an inappropriate decision question. The
risk of misleading analysis can be further reduced by the system
clearly specifying the appropriate decision problem at the outset
and only accepting analyses from the manufacturer that are
consistent with it. In principal, this can be achieved with manu-
facturer assessment. The only situation where there may be a case
for third-party assessment in this context is when the manufac-
turer is unwilling to accept the system’s deﬁnition of the decision
problem. Of course, those undertaking third-party assessment
may possess conﬂicts of interest, but, in most systems, if these are
considered a risk to the independence of the research, they will
not be permitted to participate in the assessment.
All relevant evidence. To inform decisions about resource allo-
cation, the available relevant evidence base needs to be identiﬁed
and synthesized in a systematic manner. There will always be
issues about how intensive and comprehensive this review
process can be given time and resource constraints, but the
inclusion of only a selected subset of evidence represents a partial
analysis with potentially misleading results —this is true for any
evidence-based decisions [10].
The appropriate evidence base for an economic evaluation
cannot be speciﬁed before the work is undertaken, as it is an
inextricable feature of the research itself. Therefore, there is
inevitably some scope for judgment on the part of those under-
taking the assessment regarding the identiﬁcation, extraction,
and synthesis of the evidence. Again, the manufacturer may have
an interest in selecting evidence that when incorporated into a
model, is likely to bolster the cost-effectiveness of their product.
Nevertheless, this risk can be ameliorated in two ways that fall
short of third-party assessment. The ﬁrst is by the decision-
maker, through its methods guidelines, providing a clear state-
ment of the principles relating to the evidence—namely, the need
for a transparent and reproducible systematic review of all evi-
dence, and an explicit synthesis. The second is for the decision-
maker to undertake or commission a rigorous review of all
aspects of the manufacturer’s assessment, including their evi-
dence base, and to identify research that falls short in implement-
ing the principles outlined in the methods guidelines.
There may, however, be a case that unless the decision-maker
is able to commission a third-party assessment, it will never
know with certainty whether the manufacturer’s evidence base is
reliable. There is perhaps a more compelling argument for third-
party assessment in the context of identifying and synthesizing
the relevant evidence base. For some assessments, more than one
new technology will be included in the comparison. This might
be the case, for example, if two or more new pharmaceuticals
within a class are licensed for the same patient group contempo-
raneously. In this situation, it is very likely that the full extent of
the evidence base relating to the new technologies is not in the
public domain. In which case, the manufacturer is the only
source of this unpublished evidence, but only for its own
product. In other words, in the case of two new technologies,
neither manufacturer has access to the full extent of the relevant
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evidence to include in their economic evaluation. Indeed, this
may not just apply to new technologies. Even when a comparator
technology has been used in the system for a while, if its manu-
facturer has any data relating to the product that are not in the
public domain, it will not be available to the manufacturers
of the new intervention. In these circumstances, if the decision-
maker requires each manufacturer (new and existing tech-
nologies) to submit details of all its evidence (even if on a
“commercial in conﬁdence” basis), then a third-party assessment
group, commissioned by the decision-maker, can be given assess
to this information for use in its analyses. As such, the decision-
maker becomes a clearing house for information.
Appropriate characterization of uncertainty. Uncertainty in eco-
nomic evaluation studies, in terms of parameters and structural
features, needs to be quantiﬁed and expressed in ways relevant
to decision-making. The key question is whether there is sufﬁ-
cient evidence to support a decision to fund a particular tech-
nology. One view of “sufﬁciency” rests on whether additional
research would be potentially efﬁcient (the value of further
research exceeds the cost of that research) [11]. Decision-
making should consider the extent of decision uncertainty and
the potential value of additional research, although the speciﬁcs
of the ultimate decision will vary because agencies differ in the
control they exert over public research funding and in the remit
they have to require manufacturers to undertaken further
research [12].
There are many sources of uncertainty in cost-effectiveness
analyses. In addition to the uncertainties surrounding estimates
of relative treatment effects and other model parameters, cost-
effectiveness analyses typically require a number of extrapola-
tions, each of which may be associated with considerable
uncertainties. These extrapolations may require assumptions as
to the generalizability of clinical trial-based estimates to the
general population, the exchangeability of trial estimates when
conducting evidence synthesis, and the appropriate basis for
estimating all relevant costs and effects and over the relevant time
horizon based on reported trial end points.
There will inevitably be uncertainty around the selection of
these assumptions and the resulting estimates of costs and effects,
and the adoption of different assumptions may lead to quite
different conclusions as to the cost-effectiveness of individual
treatments.
It is difﬁcult to quantify the combined uncertainty arising
from the precision with which parameters are estimated, and
these extrapolations and the full uncertainties are generally not
entirely incorporated into ﬁnal estimates of decision uncer-
tainty. In principle, the “structural” uncertainties associated
with extrapolations could be parameterized, dealt with using
probabilistic sensitivity analysis and summarized as a measure
of decision uncertainty and the value of additional research
[13]. More often, structural uncertainty is likely to be reﬂected
in “scenario analysis” in which cost-effectiveness is presented
under different assumptions about extrapolation. The ﬁnal esti-
mates of expected costs and effects used for decision-making,
and the modeling assumptions selected, should reﬂect the
decision-makers’ overall expectations of the effects of treat-
ment, not the most or least favorable scenarios.
For manufacturer assessment, there may be an actual or
perceived incentive to select the most favorable rather than the
most likely assumptions, and, in addition, they may underesti-
mate uncertainty and the need for further research. This is most
likely to arise through failure to reﬂect all the structural un-
certainties in analyses. As for the speciﬁcation of the decision
problem and details of the evidence base, a failure to provide a
reasonable characterization of uncertainty may be identiﬁed
through thorough critical review by the decision-maker. Never-
theless, reviewing such features of an analysis is not straightfor-
ward, and there are inevitably judgments required about, for
example, the selection and speciﬁcation of scenarios. For all
forms of assessment, the decision-making body will probably not
form its view about the most appropriate assumptions until late
in the process. Systems will differ in the ﬂexibility they have to
interact with those undertaking the assessments to run different
scenarios regarding structural assumptions.
Focusing technologies on subgroups in which cost-effectiveness is
maximized. Patients inevitably vary in the potential costs and
beneﬁts of medical interventions. To some extent, this variation
can be “explained” on the basis of patients’ characteristics that
are known when treatment decisions are taken. This can lead to
heterogeneity in the cost-effectiveness of interventions between
different subgroups of patients. This is not just a result of differ-
ences in the effectiveness of interventions; it can also reﬂect
variation in the underlying risks of clinical events, prognosis
conditional on a clinical event, costs, and preferences. In prin-
ciple, heterogeneity can be reﬂected in decisions by specifying
those subgroups in which a particular intervention is cost-
effective. Indeed, assuming such restrictions can be operational-
ized in routine practice, failing to reﬂect heterogeneity in
decisions can impose “costs” in terms of health beneﬁts to other
patients forgone and/or resources used inefﬁciently [14].
When manufacturers are undertaking economic evaluations
to inform decisions about their products, there may be an incen-
tive to identify cost-effective subgroups when the product is not
cost-effective when averaged across the entire patient population.
This is because if they ignore heterogeneity in this context, they
risk a negative decision for all patients. Nevertheless, if hetero-
geneity exists, it should always be reﬂected in economic analyses
by reporting cost-effectiveness separately for each subgroup. In
situations where the manufacturer feels able to show that their
product is cost-effective when averaged across all patients, they
will have less incentive to undertake a thorough analysis of
heterogeneity to identify subgroups in which their product is not
cost-effective.
Can these potential difﬁculties with manufacturer assessment
be handled short of using third-party assessment? As for the
deﬁnition of the decision problem, the objective of reﬂecting all
heterogeneity in a manufacturer assessment could be furthered
by the decision-maker agreeing with the manufacturer the
various subgroups of interest before the formal assessment
period begins. This could be based on clinical opinion and a brief
review of published evidence. Nevertheless, although this may be
possible for estimates of relative treatment effects, it is unlikely
that such a scoping phase could prespecify all sources of hetero-
geneity in other parameters, such as baseline risk, health-related
quality of life and costs.
Thorough review of a company submission may identify
potential heterogeneity that has apparently not been investigated
by the manufacturer. Nevertheless, key subgroups are most reli-
ably identiﬁed using individual patient data from trials and other
studies, and, in some instances, these will only be available to the
manufacturers.
Timeliness and costs. In addition to these largely methodological
considerations, there are two further requirements for technol-
ogy assessment. The ﬁrst is timeliness: the assessment needs to be
available to inform decisions at the point at which they are taken.
For new pharmaceuticals, health systems make decisions about
funding/reimbursement as close as possible to launch following
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marketing authorization. Although the regulation of other tech-
nologies (e.g., medical devices and surgical procedures) differs
from pharmaceuticals, decisions regarding their adoption and the
need for additional research will typically be required as soon as
product marketing begins. It has been argued above that in some
circumstances, the requirements of economic evaluation for
decision-making may be most reliably achieved through some
form of third-party technology assessment. Nevertheless, this
may introduce time delays that hinder timeliness. This seems to
be a particularly compelling factor behind NICE’s move to their
STA process for a proportion of technology appraisals. Further-
more, in comparing the pre-STA system at NICE with that at the
SMC, it is clear that the latter was generally able to publish
guidance to the Scottish National Health Service (NHS) earlier
than NICE.
It is not obvious, however, that the use of third-party assess-
ment would inevitably prolong the period before a decision.
First, there is no evidence that the assessment research itself is
undertaken more rapidly by a manufacturer than a third party; it
is just that the company is likely to start work earlier. But this is
essentially a process feature: a third party could be commissioned
as soon as the company notiﬁes the health-care system that it is
preparing to launch the product. Indeed, if the health system’s
review of company submissions identiﬁes limitations, the itera-
tive process of seeking further information and analysis, which
may take the form of resubmissions in some systems, may well
lengthen the process. Second, the time duration until a decision
may be more a function of process factors, such as the degree of
consultation with manufacturers and other stakeholders, the
number of decision-making meetings, the opportunity for manu-
facturers to appeal, and the use of expert advisors.
In many situations, however, the familiarity of the manufac-
turer with the relevant evidence and the fact that their economic
analyses often start well before the product is launched means
that manufacturer assessment will provide the most rapid
means of generating evidence and analysis for decision-making.
Whether this will be considered adequate or appropriate when
the submission is reviewed, and the extent of delay if further
information and resubmission is required, will inevitably vary
between products.
The second requirement relates to the cost of the process.
Technology assessment can be resource intensive, using skilled
researchers that are not abundant in most systems. Inevitably, the
value of assessment, in terms of its impact on decision-making,
needs to be assessed against these costs regardless of who under-
takes the research. This factor is likely to be particularly com-
pelling for health-care systems in smaller countries or those
that consider all newly licensed pharmaceuticals. Arguably, the
resource burden of third-party assessment on the health systems
that commission it is greater than that imposed on pharmaceu-
tical companies by manufacturer assessment. This is because
manufacturers often undertake their analyses at a global level
rather than separately for individual markets. They also have
easier access to that proportion of the evidence base that is under
their direct control—for example, the trials used for licensing.
Furthermore, the use of third-party assessment in a given system
will typically not remove the need for the manufacturers also to
develop economic analyses, as these are usually invited anyway
(as with NICEMTA), and would be needed in other jurisdictions.
Therefore, third-party assessment would usually represent an
additional resource cost over an assessment by the manufacturer
alone.
It could be argued, however, that the limited capacity avail-
able for third-party assessment could be used more efﬁciently,
thus limiting the cost over and above manufacturer research.
In particular, different health-care systems could fund and
commission third-party assessment collaboratively, although the
decision-making would be expected to remain quite separate.
It should also be noted that not all technologies are manufac-
tured by afﬂuent global corporations, and many manufacturers
will not have the wealth, staff, or wherewithal to undertake
analyses satisfying the requirement of decision-making. In which
case, third-party assessment may provide the only means of
undertaking appropriate analysis. Finally, for many technologies,
the cost of third-party assessment to a health system may be
small compared with the cost of making a wrong decision on a
technology’s use in terms of resources and health forgone. As
discussed above, the issue is which type of assessment will mini-
mize the risk of a wrong decision.
Does Third-Party Assessment Make a Difference
to Decisions?
Background and methods. In considering the role of third-party
assessment in decision-making, it is important to address the
question of whether the use of such research makes a difference
to the ultimate decisions. A potentially informative comparison is
facilitated by what is effectively a natural experiment between the
“standard” (MTA) arrangements at NICE (covering England and
Wales) and the process adopted by the SMC in Scotland. This is
because they represent comparable examples of the two options
of basing assessment on submissions by manufacturers alone or
third-party reviews commissioned on behalf of decision-makers.
This comparison has the advantages that ﬁrst, both bodies are
part of the NHS and therefore in principle should reﬂect that
system’s objectives and constraints. Second, there are few funda-
mental differences between the guidance on economic evaluation
methods provided by the two organizations to those undertaking
the technology assessments [15,16]. Full details of the SMC’s
assessment and decision-making processes, in the comparison
with those of NICE, are provided elsewhere [4]. In general terms,
it shares many of the features of the NICE STA process, and
similar ones internationally; in particular, the absence of third-
party technology assessment but, importantly, the consideration
of all newly licensed pharmaceuticals compared with only the
subset appraised by NICE.
A similar study, in which the SMC and NICE (MTA) deci-
sions were compared, was published by Cairns [4] and concluded
that “there are important differences between the approaches of
SMC and NICE relating primarily to the timing of the review on
clinical and cost-effectiveness” and “where direct comparison
between NICE and SMC recommendations is meaningful, the
advice has been similar.” To extend the Cairns study, an attempt
is made to give more details on the guidance compared, focusing
on the potential differences in restrictions and the importance of
patient heterogeneity. To achieve this, the main recommendations
for each drug have been categorized on the basis of Raftery’s [17]
classiﬁcation to analyze the key elements of the ﬁnal decision. To
update the Cairns analysis, new appraisals for the same product
and indication, issued both by NICE and SMC, are included.
Summary of results. A total of 25 cases have been identiﬁed
where it is possible to make a comparison between the SMC and
NICE (MTA) guidance. These include a total of 22 drugs and 18
indications. The comparative guidance is detailed in Table 1, and
more details of the decisions are given in the supporting infor-
mation on the Value in Health website. There was a general
agreement between NICE and SMC in terms of whether to accept
or reject a medication. Out of the 25 cases where comparison is
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possible, both agencies accepted the intervention in 23 cases
(although with restrictions in many circumstances) and both
rejected the technology in 1 case (anakinra for rheumatoid arthri-
tis). There has been only one case where the two institutes
reached a different conclusion—pimecrolimus for atopic derma-
titis, where SMC did not recommend use of the product,
although NICE did, albeit second line and only in children.
Differences in restrictions. Although, in the vast majority of
comparisons, the two organizations ended up with similar
general recommendations, there were some important differences
with respect to restrictions on use and the level of detail given
regarding which patient subgroups should receive treatment. Dif-
ferences in restrictions in use occurred in at least nine compari-
sons: in six cases, NICE appeared to be more restrictive, while in
three cases, SMC appeared more restrictive (Table 1). For
example, in the assessment of risendronate for osteoporosis in
postmenopausal women, NICE recommended the use of this
medication only for secondary prevention of fractures and states
“that choice between risedronate and other bisphosphonates
should be based on tolerability.” The SMC recommendation for
risendronate appears to adhere to the product’s license.
In the assessment of imatinib for gastrointestinal stomal
tumors (GIST), NICE recommended continuation only when a
response at 12 weeks is achieved, while SMC did not impose any
restriction on duration of treatment. Similarly, NICE appeared
more restrictive in its recommendations for mycophenolate
(renal transplant), olanzapine (bipolar disorder and schizophre-
nia), and alendronate and teriparatide (osteoporosis). On the
other hand, SMC imposed potentially more restrictions in the
Table 1 Comparison between SMC and NICE (MTA) guidance where the same products and indications have been appraised
Drug Indication Comparison
Alendronate Osteoporosis NICE restricts to patient subgroups that might beneﬁt most from the treatment.
NICE states that the choice between alendronate and other bisphosphonates should be based on tolerability
SMC appears to support use as deﬁned in the product’s license.
Anakinra RA Both do not recommend
Capecitabine Breast cancer Both recommend as second-line treatment
Capecitabine Colon cancer Both recommend as adjuvant therapy
Clopidogrel ACS Both recommend as combination therapy (with aspirin), but with different restrictions
SMC appears more restrictive (given initially only to inpatient)
Docetaxel Breast cancer Both recommend as adjuvant therapy
Drotrecogin Sepsis Both recommend for severe patients
Etanercept Psoriatic arthritis Both recommend for patients who failed other treatments, but with different details
NICE gives much more details on patients who could beneﬁt from use
Imatinib GIST Both recommend, but with different restrictions
NICE appears more restrictive (recommends continuation only if response at 12 weeks achieved)
Imatinib CML Both recommend for subgroup of patients, but with different restrictions and details
NICE gives much more details on subgroup of patients who could beneﬁt from treatment
SMC appears more restrictive and states that more clinical evidence is needed
Insulin glargine Diabetes Both recommend for patients with Type I diabetes
Levetiracetam Epilepsy adults Similar recommendations, but with different details:
NICE: as combination treatment of partial seizures with or without secondary generalization for those who
had failed older antiepileptic drugs
SMC: as adjunctive therapy in the treatment of partial seizures with or without secondary generalization
Methylphenidate ADHD Both recommend, but with different restrictions
SMC appears more restrictive: use as second line under speciﬁc circumstances
Mycophenolate Renal transplant Both recommend, but with difference restrictions
NICE appears more restrictive (conﬁned to subgroups of patients and if intolerant to other treatments)
Olanzapine Bipolar disorder Both recommend, but for different phases of bipolar disorder and different restrictions:
NICE: treatment in acute manic phase (more restrictive)
SMC: treatment both in acute manic phase and in stable phase to prevent recurrence of manic episodes
Olanzapine Schizophrenia Both recommend as ﬁrst line, but with different restrictions
NICE states that the choice between olanzapine and other treatments should be based on side effects (more
restrictive)
Oxaliplatin Colon cancer Both recommend as combination therapy
Peg Interferon
(alfa-2a and alfa-2b)
Hepatitis C Both recommend, but with different details and restrictions.
NICE gives more details on treatment duration based on Hepatitis C virus genotype.
NICE appears more restrictive recommending combination therapy for moderate or severe Hepatitis C and
monotherpy only in the case of intolerance to ribavirin or for mild hepatitis.
SMC recommends both as monotherapy and in combination with ribavirin
Pimecrolimus Atopic dermatitis NICE recommends (only as second line, not ﬁrst line), SMC does not recommend
Risedronate Osteoporosis Both recommend:
NICE: focuses more on secondary prevention and states that choice between risedronate and other
bisphosphonates should be based on tolerability (more restrictive)
SMC appears to support use as deﬁned in the product’s license.
Risperidone Schizophrenia Both recommend, but with different details
NICE gives much more details on use
Rituximab NHL Both recommend as ﬁrst-line therapy in combination
Tacrolimus Atopic dermatitis Both recommend as second line and not as ﬁrst line
Teriparatide Osteoporosis Both recommend,
NICE only for secondary prevention, conﬁned to speciﬁc subgroup of patients (more restrictive).
NICE gives more details on patients subgroups that might beneﬁt from the treatment.
SMC appears to recommend as in the product’s license
Topirimate Epilepsy adults
and children
Both recommend, but with different details
NICE gives more details on formulation (monotherapy initially, combination only if monotherapy fails)
ACS, acute coronary syndrome;ADHD, attention deﬁcit and hyperactivity disorder; CML, chronic myeloid leukemia; GIST, gastrointestinal stomal tumors; MTA, multiple-technology appraisal;
NHL, non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma; NICE, National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence; RA, rheumatoid arthritis; SMC, Scottish Medicines Consortium.
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recommendations for methylphenidate (attention deﬁcit and
hyperactivity disorder), imatinib (chronic myeloid leukemia),
and clopidogrel (acute coronary syndrome). For example, SMC
recommended that clopidrogel is only initiated during an inpa-
tient stay (not stated by NICE) and that methylphenidate is only
used as second-line treatment in exceptional circumstances.
Use of the Raftery classiﬁcation. A more detailed analysis of
the NICE and SMC guidance is presented in Table 2, where
Raftery’s [17] classiﬁcation has been used to categorize the main
recommendations for each product. Using this classiﬁcation, the
differences between NICE and SMC recommendations appear
more evident, and there are a number of cases where NICE and
SMC do not fall into the same group. There are more circum-
stances in which NICE’s recommendations impose additional
restrictions over a product’s marketing authorization (in com-
parison with SMC). These include a requirement for additional
monitoring, or a more limited use (only if intolerant to other
treatments or conﬁned to speciﬁc subgroup of patients). In par-
ticular, only NICE makes speciﬁc recommendations regarding
restricting use to patients intolerant to another treatment,
continuing only if a deﬁned response is obtained and to use the
cheapest option.
Heterogeneity and subgroups. These ﬁndings provide some evi-
dence of a difference between SMC and NICE MTA guidance. In
general, there is a suggestion that NICE looks in more detail at
patient subgroups in which a product is (not) cost-effective. How
important are these differences? Would the differences justify the
additional cost of third-party assessment? This is considered using
the example of medications for osteoporosis (alendronate, risen-
dronate, teriparatide), where heterogeneity in cost-effectiveness
appears to be more fully reﬂected in the NICE recommendations
than the SMC guidance. The importance of this difference is
quantiﬁed in terms of net monetary beneﬁt—i.e., expressing costs
and health outcomes on a common monetary scale.
The third-party assessment group informing the NICE deci-
sion developed a Markov model to estimate the cost-effectiveness
of drugs for osteoporosis separately for women at different ages
and with different risk factors [18]. It was found that for all the
assessed drugs, the incremental cost per quality-adjusted life-year
gained improved substantially with increasing patient age and
risk factors. This was reﬂected in the NICE guidance that rec-
ommended the use of alendronate and risendronate for women
65 years and older or for women aged less than 65 years but with
some additional age-independent risk factors, while teriparatide
was recommended as a treatment option in women aged 65 years
and older who have had an unsatisfactory response or intoler-
ance to bisphosphonates. The SMC guidance, on the other hand,
does not make a distinction between patient subgroups and
appears to recommend these medications as licensed for all post-
menopausal women.
An attempt has been made to estimate the loss of net mon-
etary beneﬁt [19] associated with the lack of consideration of
subgroup differences using this osteoporosis example. If hetero-
geneity is ignored, it would be concluded that both alendronate
and risendronate should be given to all women suffering from
established osteoporosis. This would, however, result in a loss of
population net monetary beneﬁt, compared with more selective
use, of £3,000,000 and £6,000,000, for alendronate and risen-
dronate, respectively (see full details in the supporting informa-
tion on the Value in Health web site). Similar conclusions can be
obtained in the case of women with higher risk factors for
subsequent fractures, where taking heterogeneity into account
would increase population net monetary beneﬁt of more than
£15,000,000 (see online supporting information). These values
are estimated with considerable uncertainty, but they give an idea
of the scale of the potential cost of failing to consider heteroge-
neity in cost-effectiveness.
Discussion
There is evidence that some manufacturers may be overoptimistic
in analyses of the cost-effectiveness of their products [7–9]. Nev-
ertheless, the risks of inappropriate or misleading analyses in
manufacturer assessments can be reduced using thorough critical
reviews of submissions such as those adopted by many health-
care systems, including NICE (STA) and SMC. The success of
careful review in identifying problems with manufacturer assess-
ment can be increased in two ways. The ﬁrst is for the system to
produce detailed and prescriptive methods guidance that deﬁnes,
as fully as possible, how it wants manufacturers to undertake
economic evaluations, thus minimizing the room for judgment
on the part of companies. The critical review of the manufactur-
er’s submission is then undertaken against this methods guid-
ance. This would be supported by the decision-maker being as
transparent as possible in describing its decisions and how they
relate to the (lack of) evidence. Currently, however, most
methods guidelines internationally are quite general and nonpre-
scriptive [2], and few systems provide complete details of how
their decisions are made. The second way to underpin the role of
the review of company assessments is for decision-makers to
encourage a relationship with the manufacturers that in the
context of a particular piece of analysis, facilitate an iterative line
of communication between the two about appropriate analytic
methods.
This article has argued that there may be situations when
third-party assessment has some important advantages. The ﬁrst
is when an important element of the evidence base is under the
control of a manufacturer but not the one undertaking the
assessment. Here, it may be possible for the decision-maker to
negotiate access to this evidence and to make it available to a
third-party assessment team. Second, when the manufacturer is
apparently unable to implement appropriate methods, this could
be the case with a small manufacturer that does not have the
appropriate expertise or necessary resources. Perhaps more often
it will be when a manufacturer has failed to reﬂect all the uncer-
tainties in their economic evaluation or to assess how cost-
effectiveness might vary between a fully speciﬁed set of patient
subgroups.
There are some important limitations to the comparison
between the SMC and NICE (pre-STA) in the earlier section.
First, relatively few comparisons of decisions were found (25,
including 22 drugs and 18 indications), so the differences in
decisions were also small in number. Hence, this sample may be
too small to drive any ﬁrm conclusion about the comparability
of the two approaches. Second, the timing of NICE and SMC
guidance is often different, and a gap in published appraisal of
more than 2 years was found for some products. Thus, new
evidence might have been available during this gap of time and
could partly explain some differences in the recommendations.
Third, although NICE publishes its full guidance on the
website, the SMC only provides a short version, and some
details may not be available to the public. Finally, there may be
some limits to the independence of decisions between SMC and
NICE; in particular, in the nine cases where the SMC’s decision
was taken after initial NICE guidance, the latter may have
inﬂuenced the former, thus limiting the comparison. Despite
these limitations, some cautious conclusions seem warranted.
In particular, the comparison suggests a trend for the NICE
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guidance to be more restrictive and to give more information
on patient subgroups for which a product is recommended. The
example of the two organizations’ decisions about treatments
for osteoporosis suggests that in terms of population net
beneﬁts, a failure to reﬂect heterogeneity can impose signiﬁcant
costs on health systems. The absolute value of these costs
should be considered cautiously given the uncertainty in their
estimation and the possibility of “indication creep” when
actual use of a product in routine practice does not adhere to
the initial guidance regarding the speciﬁc subgroups of patients
for which it was recommended. Nevertheless, the analysis
shows the broad scale of these potential costs, and this can be
set against the costs of third-party assessment.
Although there may be some advantages to third-party assess-
ments, as discussed above, the resource cost of these arrangements
cannot be ignored, particularly in smaller countries and in systems
that use technology assessment to inform centralized decisions
about all newly licensed pharmaceuticals. This might suggest that
systems could consider some form of hybrid assessment arrange-
ments. For many technologies, an adequate evidential and ana-
lytical basis for decisions could be provided by manufacturer
assessment. This would be strengthened through high-quality
review of submissions against clearly deﬁned and prescriptive
methods guidance. Nevertheless, there are likely to be situations
when third-party assessment (in addition to analyses submitted
by manufacturers) would be highly advantageous for reliable
decision-making. One may exist when important sources of evi-
dence are not available to amanufacturer, but could be accessed by
a third-party group. A good example of this would bewhen two or
more new pharmaceuticals for a particular patient group are
launched at a similar time and are comparators to each other in an
assessment, but no single manufacturer has access to all manufac-
turers’ evidence. A third-party assessment (together with manu-
facturer submissions) may be the best approach in this context,
although this would probably need to feed into a simultaneous
decision about all the technologies. This ability to choose between
manufacturer and third-party assessment in advance is a feature of
the existing arrangements at NICE where technologies can either
be channeled along theMTA or STA routes, although it should be
noted that since the advent of STA, relatively few pharmaceuticals
have been assessed using MTA.
There may, however, be situations where information suggest-
ing advantages for third-party assessment only emerges after a
manufacturer assessment has taken place. For example, lack of
access to important evidence sources by the manufacturer may
only become clear at this stage. Perhaps more likely is a manu-
facturer assessment in which the decision-making body, informed
by a critical review, believes there are methodological weaknesses
that the manufacturer has been unable or unwilling to correct
and that have important implications for the decision. These
weaknesses may relate, for example, to the absence of a full
quantiﬁcation of uncertainty or analysis of heterogeneity, or the
failure to incorporate appropriate comparators or relevant evi-
dence. In such situations, the decision-maker may wish to com-
mission a third-party assessment, particularly when the potential
costs to the health system (in terms of health forgone) from an
inappropriate decision are high (e.g., because the decision relates
to a large patient population or where there are large sunk costs
to be incurred in investing in a new technology). Under such
arrangements, manufacturer assessment effectively becomes a
screening process: when it is of good quality and the appropriate
decision is relatively clear, it can sufﬁce, but when there are major
ﬂaws that are likely directly to affect the decision and the costs of
a wrong decision are high, proceeding to a third-party assessment
may be appropriate.
In conclusion, there are some important advantages to the use
of third-party technology assessment to support decision-
making, and there is some evidence that its availability may
inﬂuence decisions. Nevertheless, there are serious questions
about the practicality and efﬁciency of using such assessment for
decisions regarding all new technologies. The use of a hybrid
system where third-party assessment is used to support those
decisions for which is it most crucial may offer a sensible way
forward.
An earlier version of this article was presented to the UK Health Econom-
ics Study Group (Birmingham, January 2007), and the authors are grateful
for comments received from participants, and also from Andrew Walker
and Karl Claxton. The views are those of the authors alone as are any
errors or omissions.
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